

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 186726
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY:IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:MVKENNEDY

-----043603 250347Z /14

O 242229Z JUL 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 186726

EXDIS FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 07104 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL
NATO CAPITALS ABU DHABI ALGIERS AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT
BELGRADE CAIRO DAMASCUS DHAHRAN DOHA ISLAMABAD JERUSALEM
JIDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT MADRID MANAMA MOSCOW NAPLES NORFOLK
RABAT SANA USNMR SHAPE TEHRAN TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS
USCINCEUR JUL 22.

QUOTE: S E C R E T USNATO 07104

EXDIS

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: NATO, NAC, XF

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ATHERTON BRIEFING OF THE NAC ON
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS, JULY 21

BEGIN SUMMARY. ON JULY 21, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON BRIEFED AN
APPRECIATIVE NAC ON MIDDLE EASTERN DEVELOPMENTS WITH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 186726

PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS AT LEEDS
CASTLE, WHICH DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH WEST BANK/GAZA
ISSUES ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS PREVIOUSLY PUT
FORWARD BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT. HE DESCRIBED THESE DIS-
CUSSIONS AS DETAILED AND SERIOUS, AND OUTLINED THE AREAS
OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF
THE TWO SIDES. HE SAID THAT THE US APPROACH WILL CONTINUE

TO BE TO WORK WITH BOTH SIDES, BOTH ON PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OF A TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE WEST BANK/GAZA, AND ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, WITHIN THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY RESOLUTION 242. ATHERTON TOLD THE NAC THAT HE WOULD BE GOING DIRECTLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A SUBSEQUENT TRIP BY SECRETARY VANCE TO THE AREA IN EARLY AUGUST, AND THAT WE ANTICIPATE A FURTHER MEETING OF THE SECRETARY AND THE PARTIES AT THAT TIME TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND MOVE INTO A MORE PRECISE PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL THEN BE PREPARED TO OFFER US SUGGESTIONS TO HELP BRIDGE DIFFERENCES. IN THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, ATHERTON RESPONDED TO NUMEROUS QUESTIONS FROM THE PERM REPS. AMONG THEM WERE QUERIES ON THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE US APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL, AND THE DEBATE CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE IN BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD. END SUMMARY.

1. SYG LUNS OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING AMBASSADOR ATHERTON AND NOTING THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN MEETING AT LEEDS CASTLE. HE THEN GAVE THE FLOOR TO AMBASSADOR ATHERTON.

2. AMBASSADOR ATHERTON EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 186726

HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND NOTED THAT HE HAD LAST DONE SO IN THE SPRING OF 1977. HE ESPECIALLY THANKED BELGIUM'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SCHUURMANS FOR HIS READY RECEPTIVENESS TO A MEETING ON BELGIUM'S NATIONAL DAY. BEFORE DESCRIBING THE LEEDS CASTLE MEETING, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SET THAT MEETING IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. ATHERTON SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD LAST BRIEFED THE NAC THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF US EFFORTS WAS TO BRING ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THAT HAD PROVED TO BE EVERY BIT AS DIFFICULT AS WE HAD EXPECTED, IN TERMS OF PROCEDURAL MATTERS SUCH AS PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, AND BY LAST NOVEMBER A GENEVA CONFERENCE SEEMED TO BE STILL FAR IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER. AT THAT POINT PRESIDENT SADAT ENTERED THE PICTURE AND COMPLETELY TRANSFORMED THE SITUATION THROUGH HIS HISTORIC VISIT TO JERUSALEM ON NOVEMBER 19. HIS APPROACH OPENED A NEW AVENUE; HOWEVER, WE DID NOT VIEW IT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A GENEVA CONFERENCE AND, AS PRESIDENT CARTER SAID AT THE TIME, THE WAY TO GENEVA COULD LEAD THROUGH JERUSALEM AND CAIRO. SADAT'S INITIATIVE LED DIRECTLY

TO THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND TO THE MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AT ISMAILIA IN DECEMBER. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO SEPARATE BUT INEVITABLY RELATED COMMITTEES GREW OUT OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN TALKS.

3. ATHERTON SAID THAT ONE OF THE NEWLY-CREATED ORGANS, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, MET IN JERUSALEM IN JANUARY TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THE SECOND ORGAN, THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, HELD A SERIES OF MEETINGS IN EGYPT AND, IN FACT, THE DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES PROVIDED BY ELEMENTS OF THE ISRAEL DELEGATION WHICH REMAIN IN EGYPT HAS REMAINED INTACT UNTIL TODAY. THIS POINT, THAT AN ISRAELI DELEGATION REMAINS ON THE GROUND IN EGYPT, IS SOMETIMES FORGOTTEN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 186726

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE HAS DEALT PRIMARILY WITH THOSE BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT THAT MUST BE RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR A SINAI AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED. HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND FROM TALKS WITH BOTH SIDES THAT WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUES HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED IN MEETINGS BETWEEN MINISTER WEIZMAN AND BOTH GENERAL GAMASY AND PRESIDENT SADAT. THE US HAS BEEN INVOLVED MOST ACTIVELY WITH BOTH SIDES ON NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE UNDER THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THESE HAVE ADDRESSED THE MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT INVOLVING ISRAEL AND ALL ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS.

4. ATHERTON SAID THAT IN THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN TALKS TWO ISSUES CONTINUE TO BE THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS:

-- WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 242 APPLIED TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS TO THE SINAI AND GOLAN HEIGHTS; AND

-- WHETHER AT THE END OF THE ENTIRE PROCESS THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES WOULD BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE SOME FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

ATHERTON OBSERVED THAT ON BOTH OF THESE QUESTIONS THERE HAD BEEN FROM THE OUTSET, AND THERE STILL REMAIN, FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES. THESE ARE QUESTIONS THAT APPROPRIATELY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE -- THE FORMULATION OF A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. IT SOON BECAME EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THESE QUESTIONS WERE INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH RELATED QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE GROUND ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA -- I.E., SECURITY, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE AREA -- AND THAT ONLY BY DELVING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 186726

RATHER DEEPLY INTO THE QUESTION OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE GROUND COULD THE MORE GENERAL FORMULATIONS OF A DECLARATION ON OVERALL ARRANGEMENTS TAKE ON REAL MEANING.

5. THUS, ATHERTON SAID, THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS WERE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO EXAMINE THESE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING HOW ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD, IN FACT, UNFOLD ON THE GROUND, USING AS SOURCE MATERIAL THE TWO PLANS PUT FORWARD BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THE MORE GENERAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WAS NOT DISCUSSED BUT REMAINS AN OBJECTIVE OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI PLAN OF DECEMBER PROVIDED FOR SELF-RULE AND AUTONOMY, AND THAT THE EGYPTIAN PLAN PROVIDED SHORTLY BEFORE THE LEEDS MEETING, THOUGH LESS DETAILED, WAS A SERIOUS ONE. THE PURPOSE OF THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS WAS TWO-FOLD:

-- FIRST, TO PROVIDE EACH SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN ITS PROPOSALS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN DETAIL AND TO ASK QUESTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THIS WAS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN EXPLORING WHETHER THE TWO PROPOSALS COULD BE RECONCILED; AND

-- SECOND, TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON WAYS OF CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

THE AGENDA WAS THE TWO PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES. BOTH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT UNTIL THE LEEDS MEETING, NEITHER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY, CONFIDENTIALLY AND IN DEPTH BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. THAT HAD NOW OCCURRED AND THE RESULTS ARE IMPORTANT. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE SERIOUS, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND BUSINESSLIKE. BOTH SIDES PUT THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE AND LISTENED SERIOUSLY TO EACH OTHER.

6. AS TO THE RESULTS OF THE LEEDS MEETING, ATHERTON SAID THAT ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL, NAMELY WHAT COULD BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 186726

DONE ON THE GROUND IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO OF THE PAST ELEVEN YEARS IN THOSE AREAS, SOME SIGNIFICANT COMMON GROUND HAD IN OUR VIEW EMERGED, SIMPLY FROM THE TWO PROPOSALS WHEN THEY WERE COMPARED ONE AGAINST THE OTHER. ATHERTON THEN ENUMERATED AS FOLLOWS WHAT WE SEE AS COMMON GROUND, EMPHASIZING THESE POINTS DO NOT REFLECT FORMAL AGREEMENT ON PRECISE LANGUAGE

BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES:

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD ARE IN THE CONTEXT OF ESTABLISHING COMPREHENSIVE, NORMAL, PEACEFUL RELATIONS IN THE AREA AS A WHOLE WHICH COULD BE EMBODIED IN PEACE TREATIES.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THE STATUS QUO SHOULD IN FACT BE CHANGED.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT SHOULD END AND THAT FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD NEW RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT A FINAL SOLUTION.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT THE PALESTINIAN ARABS SHOULD ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS DURING THIS PERIOD.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE ON THE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT JORDAN AND EGYPT, IN ADDITION TO ISRAEL AS OCCUPIER AND THE INHABITANTS THEMSELVES, SHOULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 186726

7. ATHERTON SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT AN INSIGNIFICANT STARTING POINT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT NEITHER PARTY AT LEEDS CONSIDERED ITS PROPOSALS TO BE IMMUTABLE AND THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED TO STUDY AND REFLECT ON THE OTHER'S PROPOSAL. ATHERTON SAID THAT AT A TIME WHEN AGREEMENT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT ACHIEVABLE IN THE SHORT TERM ON THE SHAPE OF AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION WE CONSIDER IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON THESE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BEGIN A TRANSITION TOWARD FINDING A NEW AND EVOLVING MODUS VIVENDI.

8. ATHERTON SAID THAT IMPORTANT THOUGH THESE AREAS OF AGREEMENT MAY BE, A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS SHOWS THAT, ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, THE DIFFERENCES REMAIN VERY GREAT. EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, THE FRANK STATEMENTS THAT WE HEARD THERE OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPTS UNDERLYING EACH SIDE'S APPROACH ARE IN THEMSELVES A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. EVEN ON THESE FUNDAMENTALS, WE COULD SENSE SEVERAL FURTHER AREAS OF AGREEMENT BEYOND THOSE IMPLICIT IN THE TEXTS THEMSELVES:

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT WITHOUT SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, THERE CAN BE NO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WITH A SOLUTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WOULD BE THE BEGINNING OF AN END TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM WHICH DERIVE FROM THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT TERRORISM MUST BE DEALT WITH AS A PROBLEM DISTINCT FROM THAT OF CONVENTIONAL SECURITY, AND THAT ANY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOT ONLY CONCERN THE MILITARY THREAT, BUT ALSO THE TERRORIST THREAT.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT NORMAL, PEACEFUL RELATIONS ARE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 186726

AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF MUTUAL SECURITY ITSELF.

-- JERUSALEM SHOULD NOT AGAIN BE PHYSICALLY DIVIDED.

-- THERE MUST BE FREE MOVEMENT BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK.

9. ATHERTON SAID THAT THE LEEDS CASTLE MEETING, IN ADDITION TO IDENTIFYING AREAS OF AGREEMENT, SERVED TO BRING THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF BASIC DISAGREEMENT MORE SHARPLY INTO FOCUS. HE SAID IT MIGHT SEEM STRANGE TO POINT TO THIS AS A POSSIBLE ACHIEVEMENT, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET BOTH SIDES TO ISOLATE AND UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM SO THAT THEY COULD FOCUS ON THOSE DIFFERENCES. ATHERTON THEN DESCRIBED THE MAIN AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AS FOLLOWS:

-- ISRAEL WANTS TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN-ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHILE DEFERRING DECISIONS ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY ITSELF AND THE STATUS OF ISRAEL IN THAT TERRITORY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AND PERHAPS A LONGER PERIOD.

-- EGYPT WANTS TO DEAL WITH BOTH QUESTIONS TOGETHER AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT WANTS TO SEPARATE QUESTIONS OF SECURITY FROM QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY. EGYPT MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD ATTRIBUTE NO STATUS TO ISRAEL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA EXCEPT IN A CLEARLY DEFINED SECURITY ROLE. EGYPT DOES NOT DENY THAT ISRAEL HAS VALID SECURITY INTERESTS AND IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON THEM, BUT ALSO WISHES TO LIMIT THEM TO CLEARLY DEFINED SECURITY GOALS.

-- THERE IS ALSO NO AGREEMENT ON THE MECHANISM BY WHICH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 186726

THESE DIFFERENCES ON THE EVENTUAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY WILL BE RESOLVED OTHER THAN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THEY COULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATION. THE EGYPTIANS WANT SOME FORM OF SELF-DETERMINATION OR POPULAR CONSENT ON A SETTLEMENT.

10. ATHERTON SAID THAT THESE ARE BASIC DIFFICULTIES AND THE TASK BEFORE US NOW IS TO SEEK A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA THEY POSE. THE US REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THIS DILEMMA ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES MUST BE APPROACHED ON THE BASIS OF THE ONLY AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE -- SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IN SUMMARY, ATHERTON THEREFORE SAW A NEED FIRST TO WORK BOTH ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL, NEGOTIATING NEW ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD BEGIN TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND ON THE LEVEL OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES TO DEFINE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO SIDES IN TERMS OF RESOLUTION 242. THE US WILL STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING PRACTICAL AND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES ON BOTH OF THESE LEVELS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WILL BE SEEKING DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS, NOT MERELY THE ILLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

11. ATHERTON SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAD ASKED HIM TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED. ATHERTON HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP THEM CONTINUE THE PROCESS, WHICH WAS BEGUN AT LEEDS CASTLE, OF BUILDING UP THEIR AREAS OF AGREEMENT, MORE CLEARLY DEFINING THEIR AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND HOPEFULLY TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE LATTER. ATHERTON SAID HIS MISSION IS DESIGNED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A TRIP TO THE AREA BY SECRETARY VANCE HIMSELF IN ABOUT TWO WEEK'S TIME. OUR EXPECTATION IS THAT THE SECRETARY, AT THAT TIME, WILL BE ABLE TO JOIN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN FURTHER DIRECT TALKS. WE MAY ALSO BY THAT TIME SEE THE NEED TO OFFER SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OUR OWN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 186726

ON HOW THE MORE CRITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL COULD BE RESOLVED. ATHERTON SAID HE WAS GOING FROM BRUSSELS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND TO JORDAN A FEW DAYS LATER TO APPRISE THOSE COUNTRIES OF THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS AND TO ELICIT THEIR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SADAT'S INITIATIVE DURING THE WEEKS AHEAD. DURING HIS MIDDLE EAST VISIT, THE SECRETARY ALSO PLANS TO VISIT

SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN.

12. IN CONCLUDING HIS STATEMENT ATHERTON SUMMARIZED POINTS ON THE LEEDS CASTLE MEETING IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR QUESTIONS FROM THE PERM REPS:

-- THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A VARIETY OF FORMATS -- TRILATERAL, BILATERAL, AND IMPROMPTU DISCUSSIONS DURING SOCIAL OCCASIONS WHICH WERE ADMIRABLY SUITED TO THE INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE PREVAILING AT THE CASTLE.

-- THE EXCHANGES WERE VERY SERIOUS, PROBING AND FRANK; THEY GOT DOWN TO VERY SPECIFIC DETAILS AND VERY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

-- NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO NEGOTIATE AGREED LANGUAGE, NOR WAS THIS INTENDED AT THIS STAGE. EACH SIDE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR A FULL EXPOSITION OF THE OTHER'S POSITIONS ON WHICH THEIR PROPOSALS ARE BASED. BOTH SIDES MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS PREPARATORY TO THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, AT WHICH TIME IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN OUR VIEW FOR THE PARTIES TO BEGIN TO INTRODUCE GREATER PRECISION IN TERMS OF FORMULATIONS AND LANGUAGE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 186726

-- AS TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LEEDS CASTLE TALKS, SECRETARY VANCE HAD ADDRESSED THIS IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THERE WHEN HE SAID THAT THE RESULTS OF THE LEEDS MEETING CANNOT BE JUDGED UNTIL BOTH SIDES REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND WE SEE WHAT THEY WILL BRING TO THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.

13. SYG LUNS, AFTER THANKING AMBASSADOR ATHERTON FOR HIS PRESENTATION, OPENED THE FLOOR TO QUESTIONS. CATALANO (ITALY) ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR REALISTIC AND COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT. HE NOTED THE BALANCE DRAWN BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS, AND SAID FROM THIS THERE SEEMS TO BE A "RAY OF HOPE". ALTHOUGH ITALY AND OTHER ALLIES WILL DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE MAIN BURDEN MUST FALL ON THE US. HE ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR ATHERTON'S COMMENTS ON THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF THE TWO SIDES. HE DID NOT SEE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO SADAT BUT WONDERED ABOUT THE CURRENT POLITICAL SPLITS IN ISRAEL.

14. KILLICK (UK) SAID THAT HE HAD PRESSED FOR THESE CON-

SULTATIONS AND FELT IT WAS INDEED TOO LONG SINCE THE ALLIANCE HAD SEEN AMBASSADOR ATHERTON. THE EVENTS OF 1973 HAD DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE, EVEN THOUGH IT CANNOT BECOME INVOLVED, OF MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CLOSELY. HE NOTED THAT THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH IS NECESSARY SINCE A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WOULD ONLY UNITE ARAB EXTREMISTS. THE US ROLE APPEARS TO BE AS A CATALYST BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. THE LEEDS DISCUSSION SEEMED TO OFFER SOME POSSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS, BUT MANY DIFFICULTIES REMAIN. KILLICK WAS ENCOURAGED AT THE DETAILED EXCHANGE AT LEEDS AND ENDORSED ATHERTON'S POINT THAT BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS A HELP. HE ASKED FOR ATHERTON'S VIEWS ON
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 186726

THE SOVIET POSITION. KILLICK SAW THE SOVIETS AS SITTING BACK, AND WAITING FOR THE US TO RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES. IF PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE, HOWEVER, SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO BE BROUGHT BACK IN.

15. SVART (DENMARK) ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT SOVIET ROLE AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT ATTITUDE OF THE ARAB EXTREMISTS AND WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THEIR CRITICISMS INHIBIT SADAT.

16. HARDY (CANADA) NOTED THAT THE GOVERNING PARTY IN ISRAEL REJECTS MILITARY CONCESSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT, HOWEVER, IS OPPOSED TO GIVING UP ANY ISRAELI-OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY BEYOND THE CONCESSIONS HE HAS ALREADY MADE. GIVEN THIS BASIC CONFLICT, IT SEEMED TO CANADA INCUMBENT UPON THE US TO PUT FORWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL AS OPPOSED TO CONCENTRATING ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS. HARDY, NOTING THE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND PEACE, ASKED ATHERTON WHAT THE WEST COULD DO TO MINIMIZE THE MILITARY RISKS ISRAEL SAW IN WITHDRAWAL. HE ALSO ASKED IF ISRAEL'S VIEW THAT SECURITY DERIVES FROM TERRITORY WAS STILL VALID IN VIEW OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN EARLY WARNING, ELECTRONIC MONITORING, ETC. FINALLY HARDY ASKED WHAT IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO THE NON-OFFICIAL CONTACTS IN RECENT WEEKS BETWEEN EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS.

17. PAULS (FRG), IN A LONG PRESENTATION, NOTED THAT DESPITE THE LACK OF A BREAKTHROUGH AT LEEDS, IT WAS A STEP FORWARD THAT THE EGYPTIAN PLAN AND ISRAELI PLAN FORMED THE BASIS OF THE TALKS AND THAT THERE WAS COMMON
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 186726

GROUND ESTABLISHED ON THE NEED FOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AS WELL AS A SOLUTION TO THE SECURITY PROBLEMS. AGREE-MENT ON WEST BANK AND GAZA SOVEREIGNTY PREDICTABLY IS NOT IN SIGHT. SADAT, IN THE GERMAN VIEW, WILL BE FLEXIBLE ON AN INTERIM SOLUTION, BUT WILL NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK OR GAZA AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE NOTED THE RISKS OF AN EROSION OF THE WILLING-NESS TO TALK, PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIANS, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE WITHOUT LEADING TO PROGRESS. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG BELIEVES FURTHER TALKS ARE IMPORTANT. REGARDING GENSCHER'S VISIT TO ISRAEL, PAULS SAID THAT THE VISIT REVEALED ISRAEL'S UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ITS POLICY AND THE CONCERN AT THE EROSION OF ITS POSITION ABROAD. GENSCHER TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT FRG POLICY REMAINS BASED ON THE DECLARATION BY THE NINE OF JUNE 29, 1977. HE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE PRESENT CONSTELLATION AMONG THE ARABS AND THAT ISRAEL WAS IN A POSITION TO FIND PARTNERS WHO UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION, WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS. IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL REACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS. SINCE NEITHER OF THE PARTIES SEEMED TO BE ABLE TO COMPROMISE AT PRESENT, FRG BELIEVED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION SHOULD NOW TURN TO DECOUPLING THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM FROM THE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY. FRG THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL WOULD BE WON IF THE REAL CONCERN OF THE ISRAELI PUBLIC ABOUT THEIR FUTURE SECURITY WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CONCRETE IDEAS ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SECURITY.

18. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) ASKED ABOUT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS) WAS INTERESTED IN THE PROPOSALS SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 186726

VANCE MIGHT PUT FORWARD. WOULD THESE PROPOSALS BE ONLY ON PRACTICAL QUESTIONS OR WOULD THEY ADDRESS BASIC ISSUES? BARKMAN NOTED SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM'S INTEREST IN RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND ASKED ATHERTON'S VIEWS ON THIS. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST TALKS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT "DETERIORATION" IN US-SOVIET

RELATIONS. HE ASKED IF AT LEEDS THE ARAB AND ISRAELI PARTIES CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO HAVE THE USSR ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS, OR IF THEY BELIEVED A GENEVA CONFERENCE SHOULD SIMPLY RATIFY WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED BY THE TWO PARTIES. SYG LUNS ASKED IF A NEW MEETING SUCH AS LEEDS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED OR DECIDED AND NOTED THAT IN ATHERTON'S BRIEFING THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION OF EGYPTIAN REFERENCE TO THE PLO.

19. MR. BOECKER (HEAD OF FRG MFA'S MIDDLE EASTERN OFFICE) COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE SYRIAN SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM'S VISIT TO GERMANY. THE VISIT, HE SAID, DID NOT REVEAL ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE SYRIANS ARE INTERESTED IN ARRIVING AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPT AND THE FRG FORESEES NONE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

20. AMBASSADOR ATHERTON THEN ADDRESSED THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS THAT HAD BEEN POSED TO HIM, EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE INTEREST AND COMMENTS FROM THE ALLIES WHICH HE CONSIDERED INVALUABLE. HE SAID THAT CATALANO'S EARLIER PHRASE, "RAY OF HOPE", APTLY DESCRIBES THE SITUATION. HE DID NOT WANT TO OVERSTRESS THE HOPE. IN THE PAST, WE HAVE WRONGLY SWUNG FROM OVEROPTIMISM TO OVERPESSIMISM. THE "HOPE" NOW DERIVES FROM THE TWO SIDES' COMING TO GRIPS DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER AND EACH OTHER'S SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 186726

PERCEPTIONS. HOWEVER, BASIC DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST. REGARDING JERUSALEM, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS SOME AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, NEED FOR JERUSALEM NOT TO BE PHYSICALLY DIVIDED, ETC., BUT THIS WAS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS. THE EGYPTIANS SAW ARAB SOVEREIGNTY FOR EAST JERUSALEM, WHILE THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO SEE JERUSALEM AS A UNIFIED CITY AND CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. THE BASIC POSITIONS ACCORDINGLY ARE STILL VERY DIFFERENT.

21. REGARDING THE INTERNAL ISRAELI POLITICAL SITUATION, ATHERTON NOTED THAT A REMARKABLE PUBLIC DEBATE IS PROCEEDING IN PARALLEL TO THAT GOING ON IN THE ARAB WORLD, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELI DISCUSSION IS MORE VISIBLE. THIS KIND OF DEBATE IS HEALTHY. IT CAN BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES SUCH AS THOSE BEGUN IN EGYPT AFTER 1967 WHICH CULMINATED IN THE SADAT TRIP TO ISRAEL. THE SAME KIND OF DEBATE HAS BEGUN ONLY RECENTLY IN ISRAEL; AFTER THE SADAT TRIP ISRAEL NOW HAS TO DEAL WITH CONCRETE OPTIONS, NOT ABSTRACTIONS. THE DEBATE IS ONLY IN ITS EARLY STAGES AND WILL NOT END SOON. ATHERTON CONTINUED THAT THE US OPERATES ON THE BASIS THAT THERE IS ONE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THAT IS THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT, AND WE

DEAL WITH THAT GOVERNMENT.

22. REGARDING KILICK'S EARLIER REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF SADAT'S STATEMENT AFTER LEEDS WHICH SEEMED TO SUGGEST PRECONDITIONS FOR ANOTHER LEEDS-TYPE MEETING, ATHERTON SAID HE HAD SEEN THE REPORTS BUT HAD NO EXPLANATIONS. HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THERE IS NO FINAL COMMITMENT TO ANOTHER MEETING. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THAT HE ANTICIPATED FUTURE SUCH MEETINGS, THEY WERE DISCUSSED AT LEEDS, AND WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BOTH PARTIES FELT THAT THEY WOULD BE NECESSARY. NEITHER, HOWEVER, COULD MAKE A COMMITMENT WITHOUT GOING BACK TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. ATHERTON SAID THEREFORE THERE IS THE EXPECTATION OF FURTHER MEETINGS, BUT THIS IS NOT FIRM.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 16 STATE 186726

23. TO THE SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ATHERTON AGREED WITH THE UK POSITION AS STATED BY KILICK THAT THE USSR IS WAITING AND HOPING THE US WILL RUN INTO PROBLEMS. IF THERE IS AN OPENING TOWARD PROGRESS, THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO BE BROUGHT IN. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO MOTIVATED BY THE HOPE THAT SADAT WILL FAIL, SINCE THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THEM. ATHERTON NOTED THE DIFFERENCE IN SOVIET PRIORITIES FROM THE WEST. EARLY MOVEMENT TO PEACE IS NOT TOP PRIORITY FOR THEM, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT WANT WAR. THEY WANT THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY CAN BE BROUGHT BACK IN, AND THIS CAN BEST BE DONE IF THE PRESENT PROCESS, STARTED BY SADAT, IS SEEN TO BE FAILING. THUS, THEY WORK WITH IRAQ, LIBYA, AND, IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT, SYRIA. THE SOVIET PRIORITY IS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

24. ATHERTON SAID THAT EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USSR WERE NOT A PROMINENT PART OF THE LEEDS DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION NEITHER SIDE IS INTERESTED IN SOVIET PARTICIPATION. SADAT, IN FACT, UNDERTOOK HIS INITIATIVE BECAUSE OF SKEPTICISM ABOUT GEN-EVA WHERE THE USSR PARTICIPATES. HOWEVER, ALL RECOGNIZE THAT FOR ANY COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, THERE MUST BE A WAY TO BRING THE SOVIETS IN, NOT AT EVERY STEP, BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS.

25. REGARDING THE ARAB REJECTIONISTS AND THEIR POSSIBLE INHIBITING EFFECT ON SADAT, ATHERTON SAID THAT SADAT SEEMS TO HAVE A "SUBLIME INDIFFERENCE" TO CRITICISM FROM THOSE WHO REJECT HIS INITIATIVES. HE PLACES IMPORTANCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 17 STATE 186726

IN THE VIEWS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, BUT IS LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE REJECTIONISTS. IF HE SUCCEEDS, HE BELIEVES THE OTHERS WILL COME AROUND. IF HIS COURSE DOES NOT WORK, HE WILL CROSS THAT BRIDGE WHEN HE COMES TO IT. HOWEVER, SADAT'S ADVISORS APPEAR TO BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARABS THAN SADAT HIMSELF, AND THIS AFFECTS THEIR ADVICE TO HIM. AS TIME GOES BY, AND DESPITE SADAT'S WILLINGNESS TO REJECT CRITICISM, HIS FLEXIBILITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WILL BE INHIBITED. THIS IS A BACKGROUND PROBLEM, MORE A FUTURE CONCERN THAN A PRESENT ONE.

26. ON THE US ROLE, ATHERTON SAID THAT A NUMBER OF ALLIES HAD COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A "US PROPOSAL". THE US DOES NOT SEE ITS ROLE IN THIS WAY, AS PROVIDING OUT-OF-THE-BLUE A US BLUEPRINT. OUR SUGGESTIONS STEM FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. AS A RESULT OF THE SERIOUS, NON-POLEMICAL TALKS AT LEEDS, THE US, AS A FRIEND OF BOTH SIDES, IS IN A POSITION TO FIND WAYS OF BRIDGING GAPS, NOT PROPOSING WHOLESALE SOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PARTIES. THIS IS A CONTINUING PROCESS. WE CAN MAKE A SUGGESTION ON ONE ISSUE AND THEN MOVE TO THE NEXT. ATHERTON SAID THAT US SEES A NEED TO PLAY A ROLE, AND WE WILL NOT BE PASSIVE.

27. TURNING TO THE CANADIAN QUESTION ABOUT DANGERS TO ISRAELI SECURITY ARISING FROM ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, ATHERTON NOTED UNTIL THE TWO SIDES HAVE CONFIDENCE VERY LITTLE IS POSSIBLE. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IS THE FIRST INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF SECURITY. OTHER POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROACHES WOULD BE ENDORSEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT BY THE UN AND BY THE ALLIANCE. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY GUARANTEE, A TREATY COMMITMENT BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL, IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY. THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION HAS INDICATED IT IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS AT THE PROPER TIME, IN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 18 STATE 186726

CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS, SINCE SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A TREATY. ATHERTON NOTED THAT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN AVOIDING SURPRISE ATTACK, MONITORING ARMS BUILDUP, AND VARIOUS OTHERS, HAVE BEEN TESTED IN THE SINAI AND ARE A FACTOR. HOWEVER, SECURITY IS A SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION. THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION IS THAT THEIR PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

IS NECESSARY AND THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THIS TERRITORIAL INSURANCE. FOR ISRAEL, THIS IS A REALITY, WHICH WE MUST UNDERSTAND EVEN IF WE DO NOT AGREE. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE POSSIBILITY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND/OR TERRORIST ATTACKS LAUNCHED FROM THESE AREAS. THE ISRAELIS FEAR THAT A BASE FOR SUCH CLANDESTINE ATTACKS MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED. ATHERTON REFERRED TO THE RECOGNITION AT LEEDS THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE DISCUSSED, AND SAID WE SAW THIS AS VERY IMPORTANT.

28. ATHERTON SAID THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT UN-OFFICIAL AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ARE USEFUL. ANY CONTACTS ARE OF VALUE. FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE CONCRETE PROGRESS, BUT THESE OTHER CONTACTS ARE WAYS TO OPEN CHANNELS TO DEEPER UNDERSTANDING.

29. ATHERTON POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 HAS NOT CHANGED, AND THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION IS UNIQUE -- I.E., THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 NEED NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN THE SAME SENSE THAT THEY APPLY TO SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. HERE WE REMAIN IN FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THE ISRAELIS ACCEPT 242 BUT BELIEVE THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR SELF-RULE AND TO REVIEW
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 19 STATE 186726

IT AT THE END OF FIVE YEARS ARE CONSISTENT WITH 242. ALTHOUGH THEIR BASIC POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT GENERAL DAYAN MAY BE TRYING TO FIND WAYS TO SHOW THAT THE POLICY IS NOT IMMUTABLE. HOWEVER, THE GAP IN THIS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE WAS NOT NARROWED AT LEEDS. ATHERTON WENT ON TO SAY, IN RESPONSE TO THE DUTCH QUESTION, THAT PRACTICAL ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ARE IRREVOCABLY INTERTWINED. IF ONE CAN FIND WAYS TO CHANGE RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, THIS WILL OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

30. ATHERTON NOTED, IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION ABOUT SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM'S INTEREST IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, THAT THE US DOES NOT SEE IT CONVENING IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, GENEVA IS THE ULTIMATE FORUM. IN RESPONSE TO LUNS' QUESTIONS, ATHERTON SAID WE ARE HOPING FOR ANOTHER LEEDS-TYPE MEETING WITH THE SAME KIND OF FORMAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT PRESSED ON THE PLO IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE SAID THAT IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED INDEFINITELY AND CONTAINS MODERATE ELEMENTS WHICH IN THEIR VIEW WILL EVENTUALLY BE READY TO NEGOTIATE ON THE

BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242.

31. LUNS THANKED AMBASSADOR ATHERTON WARMLY ON BEHALF OF ALL THE PERM REPS FOR HIS COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED PRESENTATION. HE ASKED AND RECEIVED AGREEMENT FROM THE GROUP FOR THE FOLLOWING BRIEF NATO PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT:

TODAY US AMBASSADOR AT LARGE ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR., VISITED NATO HEADQUARTERS AND BRIEFED ALLIED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR ATHERTON CAME TO BRUSSELS FROM LONDON, AFTER ATTENDING THE MEETINGS OF THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 20 STATE 186726

SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS.

END TEXT.

32. WE NOTE, FINALLY, THAT FRENCH PERM REP TINE TOOK NO PART IN THE DISCUSSION. AFTER THE MEETING, HIS POSTURE OF CALCULATED DISDAIN WAS NOTED AND COMMENTED ON WITH AMUSEMENT BY, AMONG OTHERS, SYG LUNS, CATALANO (ITALY) AND PAULS (FRG). BENNETT

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INFORMATION EXCHANGE, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE186726
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNA:BJSHARP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780304-0375
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780726/aaaaavxb.tel
Line Count: 796
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 5a23f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1904172
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AMBASSADOR ATHERTON BRIEFING OF THE NAC ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS, JULY 21 BEGIN SUMMARY. ON JULY 21, AMBASSADOR ATHERTON BR
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, XF, NATO, NAC
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvgwkey: odbcc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/5a23f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014